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SECTION 32 of the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003 (ARAA) deals with the procedure for 
presenting objection petitions by third parties against execution of the decrees/orders of 
the money loan court. Section 32(2) of the ARAA provides that when a third party wants 
to present a petition against the execution of the decree/order of the money loan court, 
such party may do so under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), 
by depositing 10 per cent of the amount decreed or if the decree has been partially 
satisfied by depositing 10 per cent of the unsatisfied portion. Section 32(2) also states 
that if the security deposit is not made, the petition presented by the third party would 
be dismissed. Section 32(4) of the ARAA provides that if the court while rejecting a 
petition filed by a third party feels that the petition was presented with the mala fide 
intention of delaying the execution suit, it would forfeit the deposit and pay it to the 
decree-holder. 
In Mollah Shahidul Islam v Md Monsur Rahman and Others, (2005) 57 DLR (HCD) 
164, at the stage of the execution of a decree passed by a money loan court, the 
petitioner and his brother filed a petition for setting aside the auction sale of a property, 
under Order XXI, rules 90 and 91 of the CPC, alleging inter alia that they were not 
responsible for the loan as they were neither the debtors nor the third party mortgagors. 
The petitioners alleged that their title to the property in question had been established 
by a competent court and they became aware of the auction sale well after it was 
confirmed by the money loan court. The learned judge of the money loan court asked 
them to deposit 25 per cent of the amount decreed (as was the requirement until the 
amendment of 2010) and held that in default, their case would be rejected. The 
petitioners filed a writ petition against this order of the deposit. The High Court Division 
(HCD) upheld their petition observing that: 
The petitioner in the instant case although apparently made claim over the property 
auction sold, but in substance they have challenged the auction sale proceeding on the 
ground of fraud. So the kind of claim that has been preferred does not come within the 
ambit of rule 58 of Order XXI of the CPC. It is further indicated in sub-section (1) of 
section 32 of the Ain, 2003 that the decree-holder also may file objection within the 
period not exceeding 30 days and can claim hearing for disposal of the claim made by 
the 3rd party. Therefore, the contemplation of the legislature in section 32(2) is the 
investigation of claims and objection as provided under Order XXI, rule 58 not beyond 
the periphery of rule 58, and since the petitioner filed the petition under Order XXI 
rules 90 and 91 for setting aside the sale on the ground of fraud they are not required to 
furnish any security as provided under sub-section (2) of section 32 of the Artha Rin 
Adalat Ain, 2003. (para 6) 
The aforementioned observation of the HCD in this case is very curious. Indeed, from 
the fairly unambiguous wording of Section 32(2), it is difficult for one to see how has the 
Parliament contemplated to differentiate between various types of claims that may be 
made by third parties against execution of decrees passed by money loan courts. The 
literal meaning of the wordings would rather lead to the conclusion that for presenting 
any legally admissible claim by a third party, the payment of security deposit is a 
condition precedent for the court to consider the objection petition on merit. 
Section 33(4) would imply that this requirement of deposit has been devised by the 
Parliament as a weapon against vexatious claims designed to delay the execution of a 
decree or order of the court. For waiving the requirement of deposit, the HCD needed to 
show that the petition for setting aside the auction sale is indeed not a claim. It is also of 
utmost importance to point out that the ARAA is a special law and its provision could 
only be interpreted by effectively subjecting it to CPC; if it could be shown that the 
Parliament clearly wanted that to happen. If the effect of the provision of a special law is 
effectively nullified through recourse to this type of interpretative method, then the 
whole purpose of promulgating the special law gets frustrated. 
It is quite possible to contemplate that a humane consideration has prompted the HCD 
to take the interpretative route that it has pursued. After all, reasonable minds would 
probably agree that when a person has been allegedly a victim of fraud, she/he should 
not have to go through more pain by being asked to pay a security deposit simply for 
presenting a petition to the court for the claim to be heard on merit. Hence, when an 
innocent third party's property would be attached by a decision of the money loan court, 
if the third party is unable to furnish security, she/he would be left with no remedy. 
On the other hand, even if no security deposit is furnished and the third party's claim is 
ultimately rejected after hearing on merit, the decree-holder financial institution's loss 
would generally be no more than a delayed satisfaction of the decree. That said when the 
requirement of security is waived; the threat against any vexatious claim as devised by 
the Parliament through the provision in Section 32(4) is also taken away. 
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Furthermore, it is a settled principle of law that whatever the consequence of a law may 
be, when the words in the statute are unambiguous, the words must be given full effect 
(unless, of course, the law is ultra vires) [SA Haroon v Collector of Customs (1959) 11 
DLR (SC) 200] 
In the light of the discussions above, it may be fairly said that while the judgment of the 
HCD in this case may have led to a satisfactory resolution of the disputes and justice 
may have been ensured; the intention of the Parliament as reflected in the explicit 
wordings of the statute appears to have been defeated. Thus, the apparent quest for 
justice by the HCD may have undermined the true intentions of the Parliament. It may 
be respectfully submitted that the interpretative venture of the HCD has effectively 
created a law and thus, indirectly encroached (even if only for the sake of rendering 
justice) upon a domain which is exclusively reserved for the Parliament. 
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